The Concept of Operations for the Beijing-Tianjin Campaign

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of The Concept of Operations for the Beijing-Tianjin Campaign has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• The Concept of Operations for the Peiping-Tientsin Campaign, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• Telegram to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou About the Concept of Operations for the Beiping-Tianjin Campaign, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 10, Routledge, New York and London, 2023.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a telegram to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Xibaipo, Pingshan, Hebei, China on the 11th of December, 1948. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, in 1960.

The Beijing-Tianjin Campaign, fought by the North-Eastern Field Army and two armies of the Northern China People's Liberation Army under the command of Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, Nie Rongzhen, and others, began early in December 1948, immediately after the victorious conclusion of the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign in the North-East. Acting upon Comrade Mao Zedong's orders, the North-Eastern Field Army, immediately after it had victoriously fulfilled its task of liberating the whole North-East, swept south of the Great Wall and joined the armies of the People's Liberation Army in northern China in coordinated actions to encircle and wipe out the Nationalist troops in northern China. Greatly alarmed by the victory of the People's Liberation Army in the North-East, more than 600'000 Nationalist troops under Fu Zuoyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Party's Northern China «Bandit Suppression» Headquarters, hurriedly shortened their lines of defence with the intention of fleeing south by sea or west to Suiyuan Province. The people's army, moving with lightning speed, cut apart the enemy forces and surrounded them separately at five strongpoints — Beijing, Tianjin, Zhangjiakou, Xinbao'an, and Tanggu — thus blocking their escape routes to the south and west. On the 22nd of December, the enemy's main force at Xinbao'an (the headquarters of their 35th Corps and two divisions) was surrounded and wiped out. On the 24th, Zhangjiakou was taken and a corps headquarters and seven divisions of the enemy's 11th Army, over 54'000 troops in all, were wiped out. On the 14th of January, 1949, the people's troops surrounding Tianjin launched a general offensive against the city after Chen Changjie, commander of the enemy garrison, refused to surrender. The city was liberated after 29 hours' fierce fighting, the enemy garrison of over 130'000 troops was wiped out, and Chen Changjie was captured. As a result, more than 200'000 enemy troops garrisoning Beijing were tightly surrounded by the people's troops and their fate was sealed. Owing to the efforts the people made to win it over, the enemy's Beijing garrison, commanded by General Fu Zuoyi, accepted peaceful reorganization. On the 31st of January, the people's troops entered Beijing, the city was proclaimed peacefully liberated, and the Beijing-Tianjin Campaign came to a victorious close. During this campaign, with the exception of the enemy garrison of over 50'000 troops in Tanggu, which fled by sea, over 520'000 Nationalist troops were put out of action and reorganized by the people's army. In September 1949, the Nationalist troops in Suiyuan Province declared by telegram that they had revolted and come over to the people and that they would accept reorganization.

The Beijing-Tianjin Campaign was the last of the three greatest campaigns of decisive significance in the Chinese People's War of Liberation. In this campaign, the people wiped out or reorganized over 520'000 Nationalist troops, liberated the important cities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Zhangjiakou and concluded, in the main, the fighting for the liberation of northern China. The concept of operations for the campaign, put forward here by Comrade Mao Zedong, was fully realized in practice, in spite of Lin Biao's opposition to it and his Right-wing conservatism during the campaign.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE BEIJING-TIANJIN CAMPAIGN

#TELEGRAM FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA TO LIN BIAO, LUO RONGHUAN, AND LIU YALOU

#Mao Zedong

#11th of December, 1948

#★

#To Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou

#1

The enemy forces in Zhangjiakou, Xinbao'an, and Huailai and in the entire area of Beijing, Tianjin, Tanggu, and Tangshan — except a few units, such as certain divisions of the 35th, 62nd, and 94th Corps, which still have a fairly high combat effectiveness for the defence of fortified positions — have little offensive spirit; they are like birds startled by the mere twang of a bow-string. This is especially the case since you advanced south of the Great Wall. You should on no account overrate the enemy's combat effectiveness. Some of our comrades have suffered through overrating the enemy's combat effectiveness, but they have arrived at a correct understanding after being criticized. The enemy at both Zhangjiakou and Xinbao'an is definitely encircled and will in all probability find it extremely difficult to break through and escape. About half the 16th Corps has been speedily wiped out. The enemy's 104th Corps at Huailai has hurriedly fled south and will probably be wiped out today or tomorrow. After that is done, you will be ready to dispatch the Fourth Column from the south-west¹ to the north-east to cut the link between Nankou and Beijing. We think this may not be easy to accomplish; for, either the remnants of the 94th and 16th Corps will quickly withdraw to Beijing, or the 94th, 16th, and 92nd Corps will concentrate in the Nankou-Changping-Shahezhen region for joint defence. But this move by our Fourth Column will directly menace the north-western and northern suburbs of Beijing and tie down those enemy forces, so that they dare not move. If they should dare to move further west to reinforce the 35th Corps, we could either directly cut off their retreat or launch a direct attack on Beijing; therefore, they will probably not dare to move further west. The army in northern China commanded by Yang Dezhi, Luo Ruiqing, and Geng Biao is employing nine divisions to encircle three divisions (not four divisions) of the enemy's 35th Corps; this is absolute superiority. They have proposed to wipe out these enemy divisions at an early date, but we intend to ask them not to attack for the time being, so as to lure the enemy at Beijing and Tianjin and make it difficult for them to come to a decision to flee by sea. They have employed two columns to encircle the 35th Corps and one column to check the 104th Corps and have beaten back both these enemy forces.

#2

We now agree to your sending the Fifth Column immediately to the vicinity of Nankou to menace the enemy at Beijing, Nankou, and Huairou from the north-east. This column will remain there, so that later (in about ten or 15 days, that is, when the army in northern China commanded by Yang Dezhi, Luo Ruiqing, and Geng Biao has annihilated the 35th Corps), your Fourth Column can be released for service in the east. Therefore, please order the Fifth Column to continue its march west today.

#3

The Third Column should on no account go to Nankou but, in accordance with our telegram of the 9th, should move to the region east of Beijing and south of Tongxian to threaten Beijing from the east and, together with the Fourth, 11th, and Fifth Columns, form an encirclement around Beijing.

#4

But our real aim is not to encircle Beijing first, but rather to encircle Tianjin, Tanggu, Lutai, and Tangshan first.

#5

We estimate that your Tenth, Ninth, Sixth, and Eighth Columns, your Artillery Column, and your Seventh Column will have assembled in the region around Yutian by about the 15th of December. We propose that, in the few days between the 20th and 25th of December, you move with lightning speed and employ the six columns — the Third (which is to march east from the eastern suburbs of Beijing), the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth — to encircle the enemy at Tianjin, Tanggu, Lutai, and Tangshan, provided that the enemy's situation at those points remains roughly the same as now. The method is to place two columns around Wuqing — at Langfang, Hexiwu, and Yangcun — and to use five columns as wedges to be driven between enemy positions at Tianjin, Tanggu, Lutai, Tangshan, and Guye and so cut off contacts between the enemy forces. All these columns should build two-way blocking positions to ensure that the enemy cannot escape. Then they should rest and consolidate their troops and, after recovering from fatigue, attack and wipe out some small enemy groups. In the meantime, the Fourth Column should move from north-west to east of Beijing. Before the Fourth Column starts to move, the army in northern China commanded by Yang Dezhi, Luo Ruiqing, and Geng Biao should wipe out the enemy in Xinbao'an. In the east, according to circumstances, every effort should be made to wipe out the enemy in Tanggu first and control that seaport. If these two points, Tanggu (the most important) and Xinbao'an, are captured, you will have the initiative on the whole chessboard. The above dispositions constitute, in reality, the wholesale encirclement of the enemy in Zhangjiakou, Xinbao'an, Nankou, Beijing, Huairou, Shunyi, Tongxian, Wanping (Zhuoxian and Liangxiang have been captured), Fengtai, Tianjin, Tanggu, Lutai, Tangshan, and Kaiping.

#6

This method is generally the same as that you used in the fighting along the line through Yixian, Jinzhou, Jinxi, Xingcheng, Suizhong, Shanhaiguan, and Luanxian.²

#7

In the two weeks beginning from today (the 11th to 25th of December), the fundamental principle is to encircle without attacking (in the case of Zhangjiakou and Xinbao'an) and, in some cases, to cut off without encircling (in the case of Beijing, Tianjin, and Tongzhou, to make only a strategic encirclement and cut the links between the enemy forces, but not to make a tactical encirclement) in order to wait for the completion of our dispositions and then wipe out the enemy forces one by one. In particular, you must not wipe out all the enemy forces at Zhangjiakou, Xinbao'an, and Nankou, because that would compel the enemy east of Nankou to make a quick decision to bolt. Please make sure you understand this point.

#8

In order not to prompt Jiang Jieshi quickly to decide to ship his troops in the Beijing-Tianjin area south by sea, we are going to order Liu Bocheng, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, and Su Yu, after they have wiped out Huang Wei's army, to spare the remainder of Du Yuming's armies under Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi, and Sun Yuanliang (about half of which have already been destroyed) and for two weeks to make no dispositions for their final annihilation.

#9

To prevent the enemy from fleeing towards Qingdao, we are going to order our troops in Shandong to mass certain forces to control a section of the Yellow River near Ji'nan and to make preparations along the Qingdao-Ji'nan Railway.

#10

There is little or no possibility that the enemy will flee toward Hsuchow, Zhengzhou, Xi'an, or Suiyuan.

#11

The main or the only concern is that the enemy might flee by sea. Therefore, in the coming two weeks, the general method should be to encircle without attacking or to cut off without encircling.

#12

This plan is beyond the enemy's range of expectation, and it will be very difficult for them to discern it before you complete your final dispositions. At present, the enemy is probably calculating that you will attack Beijing.

#13

The enemy always underrates the energy of our army and overrates their own strength, though at the same time, they are like a bird startled by the mere twang of a bow-string. The enemy at Beijing and Tianjin will never expect you to be able to complete the above dispositions by the 25th of December.

#14

In order to complete these dispositions by the 25th of December, you should inspire your troops in the next two weeks to ignore fatigue, to have no fear of depletion of numbers and have no fear of cold and hunger; after these dispositions have been made, they can rest and consolidate and take their time in attacking.

#15

The sequence of attacks will be roughly the following: first, the Tanggu-Lutai sector; second, Xinbao'an; third, the Tangshan sector; fourth, the Tianjin and Zhangjiakou sectors; and, lastly, the Beijing sector.

#16

What are your views on this plan? What are its shortcomings? Are there any difficulties in its execution? Please consider all this and reply by telegraph.

#Central Military Commission

#11th, 09:00